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Abstract We investigate the interplay, in international trade, between comparative advantage and
increasing returns to scale that are external to the firm. We focus especially on “advantage
reversals,” where the country with a comparative-cost disadvantage in producing a good
nevertheless is able to export it because of the economies of large-scale production. We examine
trade policy in such a situation, looking especially at whether that policy should aim at basic
policy-regime change.2
Koji Shimomura was a delightful person, a warm friend, a dependable follower of sumo, and a
thoroughly responsible academic. We miss him. Here we address a subject that he would have
appreciated. We return to the implications of increasing returns to scale for the gains from trade
and for the role of trade policy. This topic was pioneered by Frank Graham (1923).
I Introduction
International trade theory identifies three possible reasons for countries to trade: comparative
advantage (to exploit differences), economies of scale (to concentrate more productively on
fewer activities), and imperfect competition (to expose firms to more competition). This paper
discusses the relation between the first two, with a focus on Graham’s concerns about the role of
policy.
In recent decades treatments of international trade featuring economies of scale and imperfect
competition have become commonplace. But another, earlier, literature has addressed the former
with little or no attention given to the latter.  Ethier (1982) addresses external economies of scale
1
(without being all that clear about it), but, except briefly, ignores comparative-advantage
differences and trade policy (beyond the trade vs. autarky choice). Ruffin (2007) addresses
internal economies of scale (without being all that clear about it) and comparative-cost
differences, and looks explicitly at trade policy. The present paper targets the ground between
those two papers, addressing the interplay between external scale economies and comparative
advantage.
A few words about why such an investigation may be of some relevance to reality. We utilize a
two-sector model in which one sector is characterized by external increasing returns to scale. It is3
natural to think of this sector as manufacturing in general, with individual firms rendered more
efficient as a result of the infrasturcture, commercial law, industrial labor force, etc. consequent to
a large manufacturing sector, that is, to more industrialization. Such a model could supply a
natural framework for analyzing the widespread policy choices, in the 1950s and 60s, by
developing countries about whether to open their economies or to rely instead on extensive
import-substitution policies. And the framework could also be useful to analyze the choices, in the
late 1980s and extending to the current time, by these same countries about the wisdom of basic
policy reform (though in this case, ignoring international economies of scale could be
questionable).
These constitute two of the four international economic policy events of the past sixty years
that are of fundamental significance. Also, in both cases, the policy question was not about
marginal changes in trade policy, but about regime change. So, in what follows, we investigate
whether or not the role of trade policy implied by the theory is to manage regime change.
II The Model
Suppose two countries (home and foreign), and two goods: A and B (the good with increasing
returns to scale). We employ the familiar Ricardian model of technology, modified by the
introduction of scale economies in one sector.
The home economy
The production side of the home economy is as follows.
AB L  = L  + L .
A L   = A.4
B k ( L ) =  B ,(1) 
á
where  á > 1.
One unit of A is defined as the quantity that can be produced by one unit of home labor. We
assume that all markets are perfectly competitive. Were B-production characterized by constant
returns to scale, the relative price P of B in terms of A would equal 1/k in autarky.
The scale economies in the B sector are external to the firm. That is, the representative firm i
i B Bi Bi faces the production function B = [kL ]L  where L  denotes the labor employed by firm i and
á-1
BB i L  denotes the sum of all L . The individual firm, unable to influence the overall allocation of
B resources, takes its labor productivity [kL ] as parametric [see Chipman (1970)]. Summing the
á-1
production function over all firms gives the aggregate B production function (1).
Assumption 1 The economies of scale in the production of B are external to the firm.
A Take home labor as the numeráire, so that w = 1 = P  if A is being produced. The zero-profit
BB condition for B is PB  = L . In view of (1), these zero-profit conditions yield the following supply
function for B, if both sectors are active.
S P  = k  B (2)
-1/á (1-á)/á
S where P  denotes the supply price of B in terms of A.
The demand side is described by:
B D  = (ã/2)P ,
 –å
A with the demand for A therefore the residual: D  = L – (ã/2)P . This in turn generates the
 1–å
inverse demand function
DB P  = ([2/ã]D )(3)
-1/å
D where  P  denotes the relative demand price.5
Autarky equilibrium
SD B In autarky equilibrium, P  =  P  and B =  D , so that (2) and (3) determine that equilibrium. Also,
if both goods are produced, the labor allocated to the B sector is:
B 00 L  = a  k  / L (4)
(å-1)/(á+å-áå)
00 B 0 B where  a  = (ã/2) . If L $ L , L  =  L ; otherwise L  =  L.
1/(á+å-áå)
Assume the Marshallian disequilibrium adjustment process:
DS dB/dt = P  – P .
The local stability condition for this adjustment process [see Ethier (1982)] is á/(á–1) > å.
The foreign economy
Analogously for the foreign economy,
AB L * = L * + L *.
A L *  = A*.
B k *(L* ) =  B*.
á
A unit of foreign labor is defined as the amount required to produce a unit of good A.
The demand side is:
B D*  = (ã/2)P .
 –å
Assumption 2 k < k*.
In this sense the foreign economy has a comparative-cost advantage in B. Otherwise the two
economies are identical, except for size.
Assumption 3  á/(á–1) > å.
Proposition 1 Assumption 3 ensures that each country possesses a Marshallian-stable autarky6
equilibrium.
Assumption 3 implies that the elasticity of demand for output is smaller than the numerical
elasticity of supply with respect to the price; thus, a smaller output will push the demand price
higher than the supply price, which implies firms will want to expand output back to the
equilibrium level.
Assumption 3 can also be written as á + å > áå. Thus it places an upper bound on the amount
of elasticity (i. e., the magnitudes of á and å) in the model. If elasticities are high enough to
violate the assumption, scale economies are sufficient to allow the home country to have the cost
advantage in autarky, despite having the smaller k. We accordingly describe the world as
comparative-cost dominant if Assumption 3 holds so that stability obtains, and as scale-dominant
if the assumption fails, implying instability. 
If both goods are produced in the autarky equilibrium, the labor allocated to the B sector is
given by:
B 00 L * = a  (k*)  / L *. (5)
(å-1)/(áå-á-å)
0 B 0 B If L* $ L *, L * =  L *; otherwise L * =  L*.
III Advantage Reversals
Turn now to free trade between the home and foreign economies. We first consider whether there
is an equilibrium in which the home country is the sole supplier of B in the world market despite
its cost disadvantage — an advantage reversal. If this were so, and if the home country also
produces some A,
B  = ã P
–å7
B B  =  k(L )
á
B L  = PB.
An advantage-reversal equilibrium
B These are three equations in three variables (P, B, L ) and so can be solved in terms of the
B parameters. In particular, we have the solution L  = f (ã, á, å, k).
Assumption 4 L > f (ã, á, å, k).
This assumption ensures that the home economy is large enough so that, in equilibrium, it is able
to supply the entire world demand for B. In such an equilibrium, the home economy would
produce both goods and export B, while the foreign economy would produce only A.
With the home economy producing both goods, its supply price is still given by (2). As B* = 0,
the foreign supply price is infinite. Finally, the world demand price is now
DB B P  = ([1/ã][D  +  D *]) . (6)
-1/å
DSS BB In such an equilibrium, P  =  P  <  P * and B =  D  +  D *. Then (2) and (6) determine the
equilibrium. The Marshallian stability condition for this equilibrium is easily confirmed to be
á/(á–1) > å, and thus ensured by Assumption 3.
With the home supply curve unchanged as the negative relation (2), and world demand greater
at every P than was the home demand in autarky, the world relative price of B must be lower than
it was in the home country in autarky. Since home income in terms of A equals L, home income in
terms of B must be higher in the free-trade equilibrium than in autarky. Thus the home country is
better off in the advantage-reversal equilibrium than in autarky, despite exporting the good in
which it has a comparative-cost disadvantage — economies of scale dominate comparative
advantage. It is possible to construct examples where the foreign economy loses from trade, but8
they appear to be extreme.
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Proposition 2 If Assumptions 1 – 4 hold, there exists a Marshallian-stable, advantage-reversal
equilibrium in which the home country exports good B and the foreign produces only good A. In
this equilibrium the home country is better off than in autarky.
External vs. internal economies of scale
Assumption 1 is critical for the allocation of resources described in the previous subsection
actually to describe an equilibrium. With B* = 0 and with foreign firms treating labor productivity
SS as parametric, P * is necessarily infinite, and therefore greater than P . But if the scale economies
S are internal, labor productivity is not parametric, and P * is then determined by what it would cost
BB the foreign economy to supply the quantity (D  + D *), if it can do so:
S* P  = (k*)  B .(7)
-1/á (1-á)/á
SS Then Assumption 2 (that k* > k) implies that P * <  P , so that this allocation of resources, with
B > 0 = B*, is not an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Assumption 1 is necessary for the existence of the advantage-reversal equilibrium,
whenever the foreign economy could instead supply the world demand for good B.
IV Alternative Equilibria where the Foreign Economy Supplies the Entire B
Market
Increasing returns to scale tend to spawn multiple equilibria, so we consider additional
possibilities. As we are interested in the consequences of an advantage-reversal equilibrium, we
continue to impose Assumption 4, but we shall vary L* to consider all alternative relative sizes of
the two countries.9
A large foreign economy
If the foreign economy is large enough, it, too, can supply the entire world demand for B.
Assumption 5a L* $ f (ã, á, å, k*).
This assumption allows an allocation of resources where the foreign economy produces both
goods and exports B. The home economy produces only A.
With the foreign economy producing both goods, its supply price is given by (7). As B = 0, the
home supply price is infinite, given that the scale economies are external to the firm. Finally, the
world demand price is still given by (6). Thus (6) and (7) determine an equilibrium. In such an
DS S B B equilibrium,  P  =  P * <  P  and B* =  D  + D *. The Marshallian stability condition for this
equilibrium is again easily confirmed to be á/(á–1) > å, and so again ensured by Assumption 3.
Trade causes P to fall in both countries, so both the home and  foreign countries are better off in
this equilibrium than in autarky.
Proposition 5 If Assumptions 1 – 4 and 5a hold there exist both an advantage-reversal
equilibrium and another equilibrium in which the foreign economy exports good B and the home
produces only good A. Both equilibria are Marshallian stable, and in each the country exporting
B gains from trade.
This case is treated in Section III of Ruffin (2007), except that the advantage-reversal equilibrium
is not present, as shown earlier.
Since both equilibria are stable, which obtains is a matter of serendipity. Also the B exporter is
better off than in autarky in each of the two equilibria. However, the advantage-reversal case
gives only scale-economy gains from trade, whereas the non-reversal equilibrium generates both
these and comparative-advantage gains. Thus the latter equilibrium is better in this sense.10
Regime change
As shown in Ruffin (2007), stability conditions preclude the home country from using
conventional tariffs for its own benefit. But there could be a scope for foreign tariff policy.
Suppose the world finds itself in the advantage-reversal equilibrium. Let the foreign country
implement a prohibitive tariff on B. Suppose that foreign B producers have lower costs than home
producers. At this point, the foreign economy begins to export B, its tariff thereby becoming
redundant, and the world converges to the non-reversal equilibrium. So consider whether, in
autarky, foreign B producers do indeed have the cost advantage. Because the scale economies are
external to the B firm, it takes k L  as parametric (in autarky, this is also the productivity of a
á-1
unit of A foregone). Then foreign B producers will have an autarkic cost advantage over their
counterparts in the home economy if and only if
0 0 k   L   <  k* L * .
á -1 á-1
Utilizing  (4) and (5) this can be written as
0 a  [(k*)  – k  ] > 0
á-1 1/(á + å - áå) 1/(á + å - áå)
which, in light of Assumption 2 (that k* > k), will hold if and only if the world is comparative-cost
dominant. That is, if the stability condition (Assumption 3) is met. This gives the following.
Proposition 6 With Assumptions 1 – 4, and 5a, foreign tariff policy can “flip” the world from
the advantage-reversal case to the non-reversal case, presumably a social improvement.
The potential role for trade policy, in this case is just to enable regime change. Note that home
policy cannot be used to engineer a “flip.”
A smaller foreign economy: size reversals
Next consider an equilibrium in which the foreign economy just supplies the entire world demand11
for B, producing no A.
B  = ã P (8)
–å
B  =  k* (L*) (9)
á
w *  L* = PB (10)
w *  $ 1. (11)
Constraint (11) says that in equilibrium positive profit cannot be made in the A sector; it would be
satisfied with equality were some A being produced. Equations (8), (9) and (10) can be solved for
L * = F* (w*; ã, å, á, k*). (12)
Let f * denote f (ã, å, á, k*). Then, by definition of f,
f  * =  F* ( 1; ã, å, á, k*).
If L* exceeds f *, the extra foreign labor is used to produce A for local consumption. The foreign
economy supplies the world market for B, as discussed in the previous subsection, with w* = 1.
Next, consider a reduction in L* below f*. Use (8), (9) and (10) to calculate:
1 d w */dL* = [(áå - á - å)] a  L*(13)
(áå - á - 2å)/å
1 where a  = (ã  /å) k* , a positive constant. A reduction of L* below f *, with the foreign
1/å (å-1)/å
economy continuing to supply the world market for B (i. e., (8) – (10)), will be consistent with
(11) if and only if dw*/dL* < 0. From (13), this will be true if and only if Assumption 3 holds. The
basic intuition is that “too much” elasticity (i. e., high values of á and å) mean that a fall in L*
causes a rise in PB, so that (10) requires w* to fall, violating (11). The fact that dw*/dL* < 0 is in
itself interesting: It says that the stability condition trumps economies of scale in the impact of the
labor supply on wages. One might think that it would be possible with increasing returns to scale
for a smaller economy to lower wages; but the stability condition rules this out.12
Furthermore, the relation between w* and L* in (11) is clearly monotonic, from (13). Thus if
the foreign economy can supply the entire world B market with a L* slightly below f *, it can do
so with any L* below f *. Since in such equilibria the smaller country is the supplier of the good
with increasing returns to scale, we describe them as size reversals. Indeed, if L* is small enough,
w*k > k*. Assumption 1 would be critical for such an equilibrium, since home B firms would
capture the market if they could internalize the scale economies.
Proposition 7 If Assumptions 1 – 4 and 5b hold, but 5a does not, there exist both an advantage-
reversal equilibrium and a size-reversal equilibrium in which the home economy produces only
A and the foreign economy only B. Both equilibria are stable, and in the size-reversal
equilibrium the foreign country gains from trade.
Regime change
Size reversals are a characteristic of a comparative-cost dominant world. But this is just the
context in which the foreign economy can use a prohibitive tariff on B to engineer regime change
from an advantage-reversal equilibrium. The new regime will feature a non-reversal equilibrium if
the foreign economy is relatively large, and a size-reversal equilibrium if it is relatively small.
Proposition 8 If Assumptions 1 – 4 hold, the foreign economy can use a prohibitive tariff to flip
from an advantage-reversal equilibrium to a non-reversal equilibrium, if Assumption 5a holds,
or to a size-reversal equilibrium, if 5a fails.
V Alternative Equilibria where the Foreign Economy Supplies Part of the B
Market
Now consider the possibility that the foreign economy is not large enough to supply the world13
demand for B by itself, so that if it does produce only B and export it, it must compete with a
home B sector.
A knife edge
An equilibrium in which the foreign economy specializes in the production of B and supplies part
of the world market is described as follows.
B   + B* = ã P
–å
B B  =  k(L ),  B * =  k*(L*)
áá
B L  = PB,w *  L* = PB*
w *  $ 1 .
B Given  w*, these equations determine P, B, B*, L  and L*. In particular, they can be solved for
L * = G* (w*; ã, å, á, k, k*). (14)
1 BB Define  L * = G* (1; ã, å, á, k, k*), and let L  solve  (L /L*)  = k*/k.
00 á –1
1 Assumption 5b   L* =  L *
If this holds, we have an equilibrium in which the home country specializes in B and exports it,
BB w * = 1, and L  =  L . Costs in the two countries are identical, with the home economy having a B
0
sector just larger enough than the foreign’s to offset exactly its comparative disadvantage. But w*
is bounded below by unity, since in a competitive equilibrium the A sector cannot offer positive
profit opportunities. Thus any shock that increases B in the home country will initiate a
cumulative movement to the advantage-reversal outcome: The equilibrium will be unstable.
Proposition 9 If Assumptions 1 – 4 and 5b hold there exist both an advantage-reversal
equilibrium and a non-reversal equilibrium. The latter is unstable.14
A small foreign economy
Next consider a foreign economy smaller than the knife-edge size.
1 Assumption 5c  L * >  L*.
This assumption allows an allocation of resources whereby the home economy would produce
both goods and import B. The foreign economy would produce only B. In such an allocation,
B 1 scale economies neutralize exactly the foreign comparative advantage: w* (L /L *)  = k*/k, and
á–1
w* > 1. The supply price is now given by (2), where B denotes the home country’s supply, and
the  home demand is
B  + M = (ã/2) P (15)
–å
where M denotes the home country’s import of B from the foreign country. Now, (2) and (15)
imply
B  + M = (ã/2) (k  B ]. (16)
–1/á (1–á)/á –å
Differentiating  (16) implicitly,
d B / dM = – 1/[1 + å([B + M]/M)([1 – á]á) < 0.
Thus the insertion of imports M from the foreign country causes home production B to fall. Thus
P rises at home, and the home country loses. The magnitude of the price change also depends on
the parameters, so the foreign country may either gain or lose.
Proposition 10 If Assumptions 1 – 4 and 5c hold there exist both an advantage-reversal
equilibrium and a non-reversal equilibrium in which the home economy produces both goods
and the foreign economy produces only B. In the non-reversal equilibrium, the home country
loses from trade.
Both equilibria are stable, so it is again a matter of serendipity which obtains. In this case one15
of the countries (but not both) will be able to gain from a tariff policy. Section IV of Ruffin
(2007) considers this case, and shows that the home economy can gain from a tariff in the non-
reversal equilibrium.
Regime change
In a comparative-cost dominant world (Assumption 3 holds), the foreign economy can again use a
prohibitive tariff to flip from an advantage-reversal equilibrium to the non-reversal situation. In
view of the various possible combinations of gains and losses, it is possible that the foreign
economy might indeed wish to engineer a regime change. (Of course, if both countries lose from
trade, it is in both countries’ interest to retreat to autarky — yet another example of regime
change).
VI Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the relationship between external economies of scale and comparative
advantage regarding the welfare consequences of international trade. The notable feature is the
possibility of an advantage reversal — where the effects of scale economies overwhelm those of
comparative-cost differences. The existence of such an equilibrium implies a distinct role for trade
policy, namely that such policy could be used to engineer a regime change.  But this existence —
and thus this role — is crucially sensitive to whether the scale economies are internal or external
to the firm.
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Footnotes
1. Important contributions include Matthews (1950), Jones (1968), Kemp (1969), Melvin (1969),
Panagariya (1981), and Kemp and Shimomura (2000). Helpman (1984) provides a valuable
survey.
2. See Helpman (1984) for a more detailed related argument.